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Kay: The Right to Die
NOTES
THE RIGHT TO DIE
Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word,
and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and
shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death
unto life. John 5:24
And whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, or of
the strangers that sojourn among you, that eateth any manner
of blood; I will even set my face against that soul that eateth
blood, and will cut him off from among his people. Leviticus
17:10
The first of the above Biblical quotations embodies a basic tenet
in religious life today. That is the belief that God and spiritual
values transcend even death. It is readily accepted as a principle held
by most religious people. To Jehovah's Witnesses the second quotadon is a way of obtaining the everlasting life promised in the first
quotation. The Witnesses believe it is an admonition from God,
which they interpret as forbidding the taking of blood into their
bodies. The adherence to what they believe is God's will is a sign
of their faith in Him. It is for this reason that those Witnesses who
refuse transfusions so fearlessly court death. For those who believe,
there is no death, only eternal life. It is only to those who disobey
the Word, that God turns His face.
The majority of society finds no such command in Leviticus. They
have rather well-settled ideas about death. Although many believe in
an afterlife, the majority place a high premium on present existence
and good health. They find it hard to imagine why one would put
his child's life in jeopardy for what they consider no good reason.
To those who hold these minority religious beliefs, the beliefs themselves are reason enough. This is why religious cultists fearlessly
handle poisonous snakes, why Jehovah's Witnesses refuse medical
treatment for their children, and although within hours of certain
death, refuse the very blood that would save their lives.
This note is concerned with the extent to which people who adhere to these minority beliefs have the right to exercise these views.
Do they have a right to die for their own beliefs? What societal
restrictions are placed upon this right and where does the right come
from?
The basic right of the state to regulate religious practices as opposed to religious beliefs will be the first subject discussed, particularly the right to regulate children's religious activities. Next, the
right of parents to exercise their religious beliefs by refusing to consent to medical treatment for their children will be examined. Another interesting question is presented concerning religious believers
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who, in exercising their faith, challenge death but by so doing endanger others. The latter part of the note presents the questions
whether an adult can choose for himself whether he wishes to place
religious beliefs over fear of death and the right to die for his belief.
Because in most cases the beliefs at stake stem from religious
values, the right to die has been primarily based on freedom of religion guarantees in the Constitution. But along with this, the
broader concept has emerged of the natural right of an individual to
be left alone and to follow the dictates of his own conscience as long
as he does not infringe on the rights of another. In the conclusion
to this note the possibility has been explored that this natural right
may be crystallized into the Constitution through the newly awakened
and suddenly meaningful ninth amendment.
STATE REGULATION OF CHILDREN'S RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

The United States Supreme Court has held there is a distinction
between state intervention to regulate adults' activities and a stricter
limitation when the religious activities of children are involved., This
view is exemplified by the case of Prince v. Massachusetts.2 The defendant, Sarah Prince, who claimed to be an ordained minister in
accordance with the creed of Jehovah's Witnesses, was convicted in
Massachusetts of violation of a state statute. The statute provided
that no minor should sell periodicals on the streets or in any public
place. It further forbade any person to furnish to a minor any article
that he knew the minor intended to sell in violation of the law and for
any parent or guardian to permit a minor to work in violation of the
law. The violation charged the defendant with supplying her nineyear old niece, whom she also claimed was an ordained minister, with
copies of literature of Jehovah's Witnesses and with taking her out
into the streets to distribute them. The defendant attacked the application of the statute on the ground that the freedom of religion
clause of the first amendment as incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment was violated.
In deciding the case the United States Supreme Court balanced
the claim for religious freedom coupled with the guardian's claim to
authority in her own household against the interests of society in
protecting the welfare of children from abuse. The Court decided
that the interest of the state, acting as guardian of the youth's wellbeing as parens patriae3 outweighed the possible infringement on
religious rights of the parents.
I. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
2. Id.
3. The term parens partiae refers to the right and duty of the sovereign to
protect any person who is under a disability such as a child.
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In so doing, Mr. Justice Rutledge emphasized the distinction between religious practices tolerated by the state when conducted solely
by adults and the right of the state to regulate and control these
practices when children become involved. The Court conceded that
a statute identical with the Massachusetts statute made applicable to
adults would not be valid. But, because the state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over that of adults, it upheld the
statute's validity. The Court found the potential danger from the
creation of situations inappropriate for children to handle and the
danger of possible emotional excitement further justified the Massachusetts prohibition.
Mr. Justice Murphy dissented,4 finding no grave and immediate
danger to the state or to the welfare of the child present in this case.
The basis for dissent then, was a mere difference of opinion whether
there was enough danger to the child's general welfare as to allow
the state to protect it as parens patriae and therefore override the
religious practice. Both opinions felt, however, that the criterion to
be used in judging whether the religious practice should be protected
was the danger to the child's welfare. It is this determination that
has prompted courts to deny individuals the right to die or to court
imminent and probable death when children are involved regardless
of constitutional rights.
WHEN THE CHILD IS IN DANGER OF DYING

It was stated in the Princes decision that parents may make martyrs
of themselves, but it does not follow that they are free in identical
circumstances to make martyrs of their children. Judicial decisions
forbidding a parent's religious beliefs to stand in the way of needed
medical treatment for his children have followed this basic phi6
losophy.
One of the first and perhaps most important cases deciding that
parents must supply minor children with medical attention even in
opposition to sincere religious beliefs was People v. Pierson.7 A father,
who believed in divine healing by prayer, was convicted of violating
the New York penal code that made it a misdemeanor to willfully
fail to furnish medical attention to a minor. The New York Court
of Appeals found no violation of religious freedom. It stated that a

4. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
5. Id. at 170.
6. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1924); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
7. 176 N.Y. Rep. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

3

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1966],
Art. 4
LAW REVIEW
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY OF
[Vol. XVIII
parent cannot be relieved from the care of his children under the
guise of a religious belief. Affirming the conviction the court pointed
out that it was not its job to decide the merits of any particular religious belief but only to state the law as given to it by the legislature.8
Mr. Justice Cullen anticipated the distinction between state regulation of adult activity and activity of children that was to be pointed
out in the Prince case forty-one years later and in further Supreme
Court considerations regarding dangerous activity.9 He promulgated
guidelines for future legal decisions, when in his one paragraph concurring opinion he stated simply: 10
The State as parens patriaeis authorized to legislate for the
protection of children. As to an adult (except possibly in the
case of contagious disease which would affect the health of
others) I think there is no power to prescribe what medical
treatment he shall receive and that he is entitled to follow
his own election, whether that election be dictated by religious belief or other considerations.
The doctrine of parens patriae and the dichotomy of state regulation as expressed in Prince was applied to a life and death situation
in People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,11 an Illinois case. This case also
provides a good illustration of the procedure used by courts in order
to save a child's life in emergency situations.
An eight-day old infant was suffering from a blood disease and
required a blood transfusion to save her life. Her parents refused
to consent to the transfusion. They based this refusal on Leviticus,
chapter 17, verse 14. They claimed that the breaking of the commandment would endanger the baby's chances not only in the present
life but in a future life, which they felt was more important than the
present one. A petition was filed alleging these facts and including
the medical testimony. At a hearing upon the petition filed in circuit
court an order was issued declaring the infant a dependent child. The
court then appointed a guardian for the child and authorized the
8. The Supreme Court of Georgia reached a different result in a similar case,
Justice v. State, 116 Ga. 605, 42 S.E. 1013 (1902). There, the father of a five-and
one-half year old boy prohibited the use of medicine by any members of his family
under a religious belief. The court, without considering any constitutional questions, felt that a parent was not subject to prosecution for failure to furnish
necessary sustenance to the boy under a Georgia neglect statute. The father did
not hold to any specific religion but in most activity he evidently functioned in the
mainstream of community life. His neighbors described him as "seeming to be a
good Christian." This may explain the court's decision, but the case is a distinct
exception and has not been followed.
9. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
10. 176 N.Y. Rep. 201, at 212.
11. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
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guardian to consent to a blood transfusion. The blood transfusion
was performed and the court later released the child to her parents
and ordered the proceeding dismissed. An appeal questioning the
propriety of the circuit court's action was filed.
The Illinois Supreme Court in considering the appeal first decided
it should not be dismissed on the ground that the case had become
moot because the blood transfusion had already been given. The
court maintained that the matter was one of substantial public interest
and found it probable that any future similar case would likewise
become moot by ordinary standards before it could be determined by
the appellate court. The court entertained no doubt that a child
whose parents were deliberately depriving her of life, or subjecting
her to permanent mental impairment, was a neglected child under
the Illinois neglect statute. Faced with the contention that the circuit court's action interfered with the religious freedom of the child's
parents, the court applied the action to the criterion of Prince v.
Massachusetts. They noted that in Prince intervention was upheld to
safeguard the well-being of youth and in the case at bar the facts
presented a far stronger case for such intervention. It therefore held
that neither the neglect statute nor the action of the circuit court pur12
suant to the statute violated the constitutional rights of the parents.
The few cases that have arisen concerning the rights of children
to medical care have followed the same reasoning and methodology as
the Wallace court.' 3 In Morrison v. State,'4 the Missouri Court of
Appeals was confronted with almost the identical question. In ordering a blood transfusion over a father's religious objections, the court
made an interesting observation. They pointed out that the religious
freedom of the father was in no sense involved because the proceeding
did not involve his right to believe or to practice his religious belief
since he was not himself forced to take the transfusion. The court
only ordered that he may not prevent another person from receiving
medical attention necessary to preserve life. This observation is a
logical and equitable one, but later cases that will be examined have
forced the believer himself to deny his own beliefs.
The policy of protecting children from their parents' religious
beliefs has been extended to include even unborn children. In
Hoener v. Bertinato, 5 medical testimony revealed that unless a blood

12. A petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was later denied. 344 U.S.
824 (1952).
13. Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
Super. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Santos v. Goldstein, 16 App. Div. 2d 755, 227
N.Y.S.2d 450 (1962).
14. 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
15. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
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transfusion was given immediately after birth to a child who would
be born to Mr. and Mrs. Bertinato the child would surely die. The
Bertinatos were strict Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to consent to
such a transfusion.
The problem of compulsory blood transfusions was not new to
the Bertinatos. Mrs. Bertinato suffered from an Rh negative blood
factor and although her first child was born normally, as is common
is this disorder, her second child required a transfusion to live. This
transfusion was only accomplished by court order. Mrs. Bertinato's
third child also suffered because of the mother's Rh negative blood
and admittedly also needed a blood transfusion to live. Both defendants again refused on religious grounds. No legal proceedings
were instituted. The infant died.
The juvenile court judge of Bergen County, New Jersey, had no
desire to see a similar result in respect to this expected fourth arrival.
For this reason he issued an order compelling blood transfusions for
the child immediately after birth. In reaching this decision the judge
considered the parens patriae doctrine and freedom of religion argument as applied to children. He noted the reasoning in People ex
rel. Wallace v. Labrenz 6 and Morrison v. State1 and declared himself
in complete accord with these cases.
Faced with the additional problem of the child being unborn at
the time of the order's issuance, he neatly pointed out an analogy to
criminal law. In that field infants are considered legal entities and
the law recognizes that rights he will enjoy when born can be violated
before birth. The judge also added that regardless of analogies to
other areas of law, a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound
mind and body.
The extention of the parens patriae doctrine at the expense of the
parents' religious beliefs was taken a step further in Neptune v. Anderson.18 The New Jersey Supreme Court ordered a pregnant mother to
submit to blood transfusions in order to save the life of her unborn
child. The court had no difficulty in deciding this in respect to the
unborn child. It felt that the more difficult question was whether an
adult may be compelled to submit to such medical procedure when
necessary to save his own life. The court sidestepped this problem,
however, when it decided that the welfare of the child and the mother
are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be impractical to attempt to distinguish between them.
The court in Neptune is really judging that the welfare of a child,
yet unborn, is paramount to the religious rights of the adult mother.
16. 411 11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
17. 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
18. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
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The distinction between the right of the state to regulate children's
religious practices as opposed to the regulation of the religious practices of adults as a justification for state intervention is no longer
valid in a case such as this. In this case the only practice, the only
behavior to be regulated, is that of an adult. Her body is the receptacle into which the blood will flow, not solely the body of an
infant as in previous cases. But in another case discussed later, the
very fact that a child is involved, although only in a collateral sense,
in the particular confrontation between society's values of good
health and religious freedom has been used by a court as a reason for
deciding in favor of state intervention. 19
WHEN SOCIETY IS IN DANGER

When the health of society becomes endangered because of the
indifference of the individual to his own health, the state may intervene and order that the health measures be complied with irrespective of the individual's beliefs. This has been well settled since the
United States Supreme Court case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.20
There a compulsory smallpox vaccination statute of Massachusetts
was upheld. The Court found it within the police power of a state
to enact such a statute in order to protect the health and welfare of
its citizens. The Court also found the statute requiring a citizen to
be vaccinated or face fine and imprisonment does not violate constitutional rights. It reasoned that persons and property are subjected to restraints in order to assure the general health of the state.
From this decision and other court determinations,21 it has become well' settled that if an individual wishes to court death by refusing to allow himself to be vaccinated for a dangerous, contagious
disease, the state may step in and require that such vaccinations be
given. This would be justified as intervention in the health interest
of the community.
This policy is logical. Just as a parent may not make a martyr of
his child in order to satisfy his own religious beliefs, one may not
19. Application of Georgetown College Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
petition for rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
20. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
21. In City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 107 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303
(1917) a city ordinance requiring vaccination from smallpox was held not to violate
a provision of the state constitution guaranteeing religious freedom. The state
court found that the religious freedom provision did not relieve one from
obedience to reasonable health regulations enacted under the police power of the
state. This is so despite the fact that such regulations may not conform to one's
religious beliefs. See also Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 128, 188 N.E. 677 (1934);
State v. Drew, 89 N.H. 54, 192 Ad. 629 (1937).
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make martyrs of his fellow citizens by exposing them to a contagious
disease.
Courts have felt that society has an overriding interest in protecting the lives of its citizens when actual religious ritual is involved.
The proof of the sincerity of a member's belief in the Holiness
Church in Hamilton County, Tennessee, was believed to be manifested
by the handling of poisonous snakes and the entwinement of them
around the bodies of the faithful. This practice, at church meetings,
however, ran contrary to a Tennessee statute that made it unlawful
for any person or persons to display, exhibit, handle, or use any reptile in such a way as to endanger the life or health of any person.
The value of good health as opposed to minority religious practices
dangerous to life collided when a member of the church was convicted of a violation of the statute and appealed the conviction to
the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In Hardin v. State2 2 the court
preferred the value of good health over religion. Although the defendant argued that the statute denied them their religious freedom,
the Tennessee Court decided the freedom to act as distinguished
from the freedom to believe is not absolute but rather is subject to
regulation. Constitutional religious guarantees cannot be invoked as
a protection against legislation for punishment of acts contrary to the
peace and good order of society.
Because the practitioners felt it necessary to string a rope in
front of the stage to keep the audience away from the snakes the
court felt justified in concluding that the danger to the audience outweighed the infringement on the religious practice of the church. If
the court had stopped at this reasoning the decision would have been
reasonable and in accordance with other cases, but the court extended
the argument by speaking of the danger to the person who, while
23
practicing his beliefs, was handling the snakes.
If it is this danger the court feels the state can regulate, it is embarking on a different theory from previous holdings.24 What the
court would then be deciding is that a man does not have the natural
right to choose for himself whether or not to put his own life in
danger. This goes against the often-quoted martyr language in
Prince. If this were so, a man would not only be forbidden from
making a martyr of his child or his fellow citizens but would not
even be allowed to be a martyr himself.
22. 188 Tenn. 77, 216 S.W. 20, 708 (1949).
23. Id. at 78.
24. In other cases such as Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1903) and
City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, 107 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303 (1917) the
courts forbid the religious practice because of the danger involved to society as a
whole and not to the particular individual.
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WHEN AN ADULT Is INVOLVED

The right to make decisions concerning exercise of religious belief,
dangerous to the health of one's children or to society as a whole, is
far from absolute. But the question of the right to exercise religious
beliefs that may endanger the life of the adult himself is still an open
question. This is so despite the celebrated case of Application of
25
Georgetown, Inc.
The Georgetown case was a unique proceeding in which a single
judge entered an order allowing a blood transfusion to an adult
member of Jehovah's Witnesses, the mother of a seven-month old
child. The patient, suffering from a bleeding ulcer, would not consent
to a blood transfusion because of her religious beliefs. A physician
and hospital authorities, firmly convinced that the woman would die
without the transfusion, originally appeared before a federal district
court judge and orally requested an order permitting the administering of blood transfusions, alleging that the patient was in extremis.
After denial of the request, an appeal was taken to the United States
Court of Appeals where Judge J. Skelley Wright, acting by authority
of Rule 62G of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 6 overruled the
district court and signed an order permitting administration of blood
as necessary.
Judge Wright based his decision on five considerations. One was
the emergency situation that forced the judge to act immediately and
to prefer his value of life over death. Another dealt with his conceptions that there is a public policy against suicide,27 as well as noting
that by seeking hospital treatment in the first place the patient manifested a desire to live rather than die. A third concerned the question
of hospital liability. For the purposes of this note the other two
considerations merit exploration.
The first of these was the question of competency. Judge Wright
analogized the cases involving a parent's refusal to consent to a blood
transfusion on his child to the case at bar, which involved not the
parent-child relationship but an adult husband-wife relationship. He
thought because the patient-wife was in extremis she was as incompetent to make a decision about her life as the law says a child is,
regardless of his circumstance. He continued the analogy to the
25. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
26. The relevant section of the rule recognizes the "power of an appellate
court or of a judge to grant an injunction during pendency of an appeal or to
make an order appropriate to preserve the status quo."
27. The topic of suicide is beyond the scope of this note, but there appears
to be a difference between affirmative action designed to take one's own life, which
by its very nature may endanger society (stray gun shots, leaking gas, et cetera) or
cause chaos, and passive action such as simply asking to be left alone to die.
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parent-child relationship by looking to the husband for his consent,
treating the husband as the guardian for his wife. Discovering that
the husband would also be unwilling to consent to the medical treatment that would save his wife's life, however, the judge refused to
appoint the husband as guardian.
The last consideration was the welfare of the patient's child.
Judge Wright reasoned that the mother's failure to take the necessary
measures to save her life was tantamount to child abandonment. If
the state is to act as parenspatriae, protecting the child's best interests,
it cannot allow a parent to abandon a child by choice. Thus the
state had an interest in preserving the life of this mother.
Judge Wright in Georgetown has shifted the focus from the questions relating to the right of an adult to shape his own destiny to
questions relating to the status of the adult. He decided that the state
may not only define the right to die and situations where it exists,
but granting that the right does exist it may make the determination
when one is incapable of exercising it. This is control on two levels.
By using the abandonment argument, the judge looked to the welfare
of the child. But in this case the child would not be orphaned if
the mother died. Although it is not in a child's best interest to be
without a mother, one may seriously question the amount of love the
child will receive from a mother who believes that God has turned
His face from her because of a sacrifice she was forced to make for
the child. On the contrary, it appears that the state might have to
move in as parens patriae to protect the child's welfare by keeping it
away from the mother after the transfusion. This is because the traumatic experience of a mother, forced to give up her religion for the
sake of her child, may manifest itself in resentment toward the child. 28
A petition was filed seeking a heading en banc but it was denied
for procedural reasons.2 9 The opinion of the other members of the
court seemed to indicate they were far from sure that Judge Wright's
decision was a proper one. Especially devastating to Judge Wright's
decision was the dissenting opinion of Judge Berger.30 His thesis
was there are some areas of private and public concern that are beyond the power of the state to control, no matter how well meaning
the state's motives. Referring to the right to be let alone philosophy
of Justice Brandeis he quoted this language: 31
28. The abandonment argument can be extended to support the contention
that citizens be kept alive. The state can benefit from their work, they can pay
taxes, and fight wars. These arguments should have little appeal, however, in a
society such as ours where the individual is keeper of the state instead of the
state being guardian of the individual.
29. 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
30. Id. at 1015.
31. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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The makers of the Constitution sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, and their sensations. They conferred as against the government the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized man.
Judge Berger added that nothing in Brandeis's utterance suggests
that an individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs,
valid thoughts, reasonable emotions, and well-founded sensations. He
concluded that Mr. Justice Brandeis intended to include a great
many foolish and unreasonable ideas that do not conform to social
norms such as refusing medical treatment even at great risk.
Subsequent decisions have leaned toward this approach to the
problem.2 Furthermore, a recent Supreme Court decision 83 has
awakened a sleeping giant, the ninth amendment, which can give
concrete meaning to the right to be let alone philosophy of Brandeis
and to the natural right to die.
The case most in point with the particular subject of an adult's
right to die is the recent case of In re Brook's Estate.34 The Supreme
Court of Illinois considered the case of Mrs. Brooks, who because of
her religious belief based on Leviticus 17:10 and other Biblical quotations, had repeatedly refused to consent to blood transfusions although her doctors felt it a necessity for her recovery from a peptic
ulcer for which she was being treated in the hospital. Mrs. Brooks and
her husband had signed a document releasing the doctor and the
hospital from all civil liability. The patient was assured there would
be no further effort to persuade her to accept blood. Despite these
assurances, the doctor and hospital officials appeared before the probate division of the circuit court with a petition by the public
guardian requesting appointment of that officer as conservator of
Mrs. Brooks and further requested an order authorizing the conservator to consent to administration of whole blood to the patient. This
was so ordered, the transfusion was administered and Mrs. Brooks
left the hospital. Mrs. Brooks and her husband then appealed to
have all orders in the conservatorship proceeding expunged and the
petition dismissed.
32. In re Brooks Estate, 32 IM.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Ericken v. Dilgord, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1964). In Ericken, there was no question
but that the adult was fully capable of making the decision that he did not wish
to have a transfusion. The court decided, despite the reliable opinion of the doctors, in a government that gives the greatest possible protection to the individual
and his desires it is the individual himself who has the final say in decisions concerning his own medical needs. This case may be distinguished from Georgetown
because here there was no question but that the patient was competent at all times.
33. Griswold v. State, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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The court first met the contention of the appellees that because the
transfusion had been completed, the cause was moot. Using the lan35
guage of its former decision in People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz
the court noted that when there is an issue of substantial public
interest, a well recognized exception exists to the general rule that
a case, which has become moot, will be dismissed upon appeal. Having decided this, the court proceeded to the fundamental issue posed
by the facts. The court was faced with the question whether an adult
without minor children may be compelled to accept treatment that
would probably save her life, but which is forbidden by her religious
convictions. It had to decide whether an adult woman, whose mental
and physical faculties had been weakened by approaching death, had
a right to die. This court felt that she did. The court made a distinction here between Georgetown and the case at bar, because in
Georgetown the patient had a minor child. It also noted the misgivings of some members of the appeals court in the denial of the
en banc proceeding and read Berger's dissenting opinion as suggesting that a majority of the court would have refused the order if
afforded the opportunity.
The court then discussed the accepted concepts of religious freedom and concluded that the first amendment protects the absolute
right of every individual to both the freedom in and the exercise
of his religious belief. This exercise they found to be subject to the
qualification of lawful state regulation only when it clearly and presently endangers the public health, welfare, or morals. Applying these
concepts to the case at bar, it found an adult woman, well aware of
the possible consequences of her action, who had consented to relieve
the hospital from any civil liability. No minor children were involved.
No overt or affirmative act of hers offered any clear and present
danger to society. Even though the beliefs of Mrs. Brooks may be
considered "foolish and unwise"36 the court stated that she had a
right to exercise those views: 3
In the final analysis what has happened here involves a
judicial attempt to decide what course of action is best for a
particular individual, notwithstanding that individual's contrary views based upon religious convictions. Such action cannot be constitutionally countenanced.

35. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952).
36. Indeed, courts do not have the knowledge to determine what is "foolish

and unwise." It is in fact outside their province. See United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1943) in which Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion pleads to have
done with the business of judicially examining other people's faiths. Supra at 95.
37. 32 111. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435, 442 (1965).
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This decision creates a logical framework for deciding the basic
problem. If a child's life is in danger, a parent should not be allowed
to sacrifice that life on the altar of the parent's own personal beliefs.
Although not quite so visible, it may also be argued that when an
unborn child's life is in danger the adult's value must also fall. Few
would argue that society should be placed in peril merely because a
single individual has no fear of danger. But in cases in which solely
an adult is involved, and when that adult steadfastly refuses medical
aid as occurred in Georgetown and Brooks, it ill behooves a court of
law to decide the individual does not have the right to die. That decision must be made only by the individual and his God.
In analysis of the cases decided, it appears the right to die for
one's religious beliefs may be protected if: (1) no children are directly
involved or (2) no danger to the health of society appears imminent.
Other limiting conditions may possibly include: (1) the life of the
mother is intertwined with the child and (2) the patient is in extremis
and judged incompetent and therefore unable to exercise his right
in a court using the Georgetown rationale. It appears that when the
right has been protected it has been based on a synthesis of the limited
right to exercise religious beliefs under the first amendment and a
rather vague belief that there is an abstract right to be let alone
guaranteed by the Constitution, although not specifically enumerated.
THE

RIGHT

To DIE AND

THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The right, to die when it has been found to exist, has been primarily based on the limited right to exercise one's religious beliefs
as guaranteed by the first amendment. But when considering the
broad scope of the question those who feel that such a right does in
fact exist have felt the need to base it on a more fundamental concept.
For ,example, there may be instances in which a person chooses to
endanger his own life for other than religious reasons. The use of
the broader scope concept can be found in the Brookss decision and
in Judge Berger's dissent in the Georgetown 9 case. In both instances,
reference has been made to Mr. Justice Brandeis's opinion in Olinstead v. United States,40 wherein he stated that the right to be let
alone is the most comprehensive of all rights. It seems that this right
appears when one man can say:
The action I am taking is my own private affair. The fact that
I am allowed this privacy is my natural birthright as an individual.
38. Id.
39. 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
40. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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It is a manifestation of the human dignity that all men by nature
possess. The action I am taking does not cause harm to any
other man. The action may seem ridiculous, unwise or foolish to
others, but because I believe in it and because I am a man it is
my own private affair.
The right to die complements and falls within the right to be let
alone concept. What could be more of a testimony to the dignity
and individuality of man than the right to decide for himself exactly
what concepts and beliefs are worth dying for? The soldiers who
marched away on crusades to the Holy Land and faced almost certain
death in search of a Holy Grail would seem to one who had no concept of the meaning of Christianity to be giving up their lives foolishly. Should they have not been allowed to go? Should the Christian
martyrs who were faced with the choice either of denying God or
facing death in Roman arenas have been denied the opportunity to
choose that faithfulness to their God was more important and real
than life could ever be? Each man, no matter what his beliefs,
should be able to make the decision that his beliefs are worth dying
for.
The right, therefore, exists, and it may be exercised if its exercise
does harm to no other man. The question remains, however, whether
there exists in our Constitution a legal basis for the exercise of the
right to be let alone.
The right to be let alone is not enumerated in the Constitution.
But in the recent case of Griswold v. State,41 Mr. Justice Goldberg,
joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan stated
that the framers of the Constitution believed there are additional
fundamental rights protected from governmental infringement that
exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight amendments to the Constitution. He based this on the
language and history of the ninth amendment.
The ninth amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the People." Bennett B. Patterson, in his treatise,
The Forgotten Ninth Amendment, 2 one of the only three works to
deal with the ninth prior to the Griswold decision, states that the
ninth amendment is a basic statement of the inherent natural rights
of the individual. He says it is a recognition of individualism and
inherent right, and such a declaration is found nowhere else in the
Constitution. Its absence elsewhere in the Constitution accounts for
its very presence in the ninth amendment. Both Mr. Justice Goldberg
41.
42.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
PATTERSON, THE FORCOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol18/iss4/4

(1955).
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in Griswold and Mr. Patterson agree that it was enacted to quiet
expressed fears among the framers that a bill of specifically enumerated
rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and
the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial
that others were protected.
What Mr. Justice Goldberg is saying in Griswold is that the ninth
amendment does have meaning after all, even though it has long
been ignored by the courts. It guarantees the eternal existence of
natural fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution but
none the less worthy of protection by state and federal government.
In Griswold, Mr. Justice Goldberg found that the right to a private
married life was, although not enumerated in the Constitution, exactly the kind of fundamental right guaranteed by the ninth amendment and protected from abridgement by the Government.
The right to die is also fundamental and has a rightful place in
the Constitution although not-specifically mentioned. Perhaps when
the framers drew up the Constitution and specifically protected life
they thought of this right to die. They may have thought it necessary to enumerate particularly the right of a man to live, and in that
life enjoy freedom of conscience outside government control. The
enumeration of the right to live freely was quite appropriate since
this was a new and novel concept among nations. But the right of a
man to die for his beliefs was no new concept. Tyrants for centuries
had not only been allowing men to die for their beliefs but had been
forcing them to do so. For this reason the framers may have classified
the right as too fundamental to enumerate and left it instead to the
protection of the ninth amendment and the eternal tolerance of man.
EDWARD

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

M. KAY

15

